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THE EPA AT 40: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Environmental Protection Agency is in many respects a
1
unique agency in the overall structure of United States governance.
Created in 1970 by presidential initiative rather than congressional
legislation, it was given a sweeping new series of statutory mandates
and powers that both nationalized the core functions of pollution and
toxic chemicals control, and defined them overwhelmingly as
regulatory functions—augmented in some cases by federal
subsidies—rather than broader and more integrated management
responsibilities. Paradoxically, it was given these mandates in
response to massive bipartisan popular demand for federal leadership
in solving the pollution problem at a time when the public was
otherwise increasingly skeptical of and even hostile to the federal
government. Liberals were opposed to the government’s Vietnam
War policies; conservatives resisted the government’s civil rights
policies; and the growing environmental movement itself questioned
the government’s policies of multipurpose dam-building and stream
channelization, clear-cutting of the national forests, promotion and
subsidization of nuclear power, and more generally promoting the use
of the natural environment primarily for industrial resource
extraction and economic development.
In the academic literature of the 1960s and early 1970s, political
scientists were writing scathingly about the capture of agencies by the
businesses they were supposed to be regulating, and about the control
of policymaking by “iron triangles” of favored interests, congressional
subcommittees beholden to them, and the agencies they oversaw.
Economists were becoming increasingly vocal against these traits in
* Professor of Public Policy and of Environmental Sciences & Engineering, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. Originally presented at the Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum Symposium,
January 24, 2011, based in part on work originally published in R.N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING
THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY (2d ed. 2006).
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economic regulatory agencies responsible for regulating the airline,
trucking and railroad, and telecommunications industries. In short,
the Progressive ideal that had justified the discretionary powers of the
federal agencies for two-thirds of a century since Theodore
Roosevelt—the ideal of good government through scientific
management by politically neutral, technocratic administrators—was
2
becoming increasingly discredited from the left as well as the right.
Yet in the midst of all these criticisms of government, both
academic and popular, a conservative Republican president, Richard
Nixon, created the Environmental Protection Agency. And in the
Congress, solidly bipartisan majorities vested this new agency with
sweeping new powers to regulate pollution and toxic chemicals, to
impose federal mandates on state and local governments both to
implement and comply with these regulations, and to subsidize both
state regulatory agencies and local wastewater treatment facilities on
an unprecedented scale.
By the end of its first decade, EPA had begun to achieve
significant results in reducing pollution from the sources it was
empowered to regulate, although the limitations and costs of those
successes were also becoming evident. A more serious problem was
developing, however: a fracturing of the bipartisan support that EPA
had initially enjoyed. While environmental protection remained a
widely supported and largely nonpartisan value for the general public,
among elected politicians and interest groups it became a surrogate
for an increasingly ideological and partisan conflict over the role of
government regulation in achieving it. This reframing of the issue
pitted liberal Democrats, and a dwindling minority of moderate
Republicans, against an increasingly vocal anti-government core of
the Republican Party which was augmented on individual issues by
Democrats from districts whose businesses were burdened by
environmental regulations.
As a result, the EPA has become confined to incomplete and
variable implementation of a set of laws and policies that, with few
exceptions, were put in place more than thirty years ago. It has been
chronically underfunded and subjected to increasing burdens of
proof, oversight, and litigation; and with changes in presidential
administrations, its priorities have repeatedly been subjected to
radical swings and even attempts at fundamental reversal. None of its
basic statutes have been repealed—few have even been significantly

2. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 218–20, and associated notes and references.
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modified—and the general public still supports environmental
protection broadly, if only shallowly. But even policy reforms that
would arguably benefit both the economy and the environment have
been held hostage to the increasingly bitter partisan and ideological
gridlock of Congressional and presidential politics.
This history need not be destiny. Environmental protection is too
important—to the economy, to the American people, and to the
continued sustainability of modern civilization—to be consigned to
the status of a political football of partisan and ideological politics.
Serious environmental hazards remain unsolved: global warming
most obviously, but also air and water pollution, groundwater and
marine contamination, and new health hazards such as nanoparticles,
among others. Environmental protection often has characteristics that
require government intervention—most obviously market failures
such as externalities and open-access resources (“tragedies of the
commons”)—but it is not inherently anti-business. From a firm’s
perspective, not only is pollution a waste of materials and energy that
have been bought and paid for, but it also creates liability risks and
other harmful social costs. From a broader economic perspective, it
also creates jobs in firms that impose less social costs in the forms of
damage to health and environmental assets.
Environmental protection is not necessarily best accomplished,
however, solely by the regulatory tools that were most attractive in
the 1970s. Both the economy and the environment could be better
served by policy innovations that would promote more integrated
solutions, more self-enforcing incentives, and more rigorous, yet more
stable, environmental performance expectations. The challenge for
Americans on all points of the political spectrum who aspire to
maintain a livable environment, as well as a healthy and innovative
economy, is to move EPA from its partially successful but
problematic history over the past forty years to a renewed vision of
the environment we want to live in and pass on, and to a more
effective and integrated suite of policy tools and priorities for
achieving that vision.
This article provides an historical perspective on the origins of
EPA, its mission and structure, its history to date, and the challenges
it faces as a result both of the strengths and limitations of its powers
and of the changing political context in which it must function. The
article then suggests some of the ways in which environmental
protection could be pursued differently and perhaps more effectively
than under mere continuation of EPA’s traditional regulatory
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authorities, and it documents the challenges of path dependence and
political gridlock that would have to be overcome to achieve a more
effective framework for U.S. environmental protection policy.
II. ORIGINS
The EPA was created in the context of an extraordinary outburst
of mass public pressure for federal action to address the widespread
pollution problems that had resulted from the vast post-war growth in
industrial production and mass consumption. Environmental
protection had historically been left almost entirely to state and local
jurisdictions—a president as recent as Dwight Eisenhower had
3
described air and water pollution as “uniquely local” problems —and
while a few states such as California had taken aggressive actions to
address some pollution problems, most had not. Those few that
sought to do so were limited by a lack of powers to address interstate
sources and by the risk of losing businesses and jobs to more lenient
states.
With the advent of television and the rise of a relatively affluent
mass middle class, the American public in the 1960s witnessed a series
of environmental crises: extreme smog disasters in Los Angeles and
elsewhere, radioactive fallout in milk, the indiscriminate use of
pesticides, the Santa Barbara oil spill, Ohio’s Cuyahoga River
catching fire, Lake Erie being declared “dead” due to oxygen
depletion, the environmental risks of the proposed Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System, and others. By 1970, a common concern had begun
to develop that environmental pollution was out of control. This
concern culminated in April 1970 with the first Earth Day
celebration, the largest nationwide public demonstrations that had
4
occurred since the victory celebrations at the end of World War II.
President Richard Nixon had no previous record of public
concern for the environment except a single radio address during his
1968 campaign, but he recognized both the risk posed and the
opportunity presented by the mass public demand for federal action
on the issue. Senator Edmund Muskie, a Democrat from Maine and
the author of most of the federal environmental legislation in the
1960s and of the Clean Air Act amendments then under
consideration, was widely recognized as a likely presidential

3. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND
JOHNSON YEARS 323 (1968).
4. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 201–26.
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candidate in 1972. At the same time, mass public demand for federal
action on the environment offered a welcome opportunity for
presidential leadership on a consensus issue: diverting the national
agenda from the divisiveness of the Vietnam War and civil rights
issues that were otherwise dominant.
It is fair to say that President Nixon saw a mob coming, jumped
in front of it and called it a parade. On New Year’s Day 1970 he
signed the National Environmental Policy Act (no relation to EPA,
but a visionary statement of federal policy commitment to
environmental protection) on national television, declaring the 1970s
to be the “decade of the environment” in which “it was either now or
5
never” to clean up pollution and environmental damage. In late
January, he addressed environmental issues forcefully in his State of
6
the Union address. Subsequently, in February, he delivered a special
environmental speech to Congress, enunciating a specific 37-point
7
program for environmental cleanup. In April, the first Earth Day
8
celebration took place. In July, Nixon issued a Presidential
Reorganization Plan creating the Environmental Protection Agency,
9
to take effect that December. And in December, Congress passed
10
and Nixon signed the landmark Clean Air Act of 1970, the first of a
series of major new environmental statutes establishing primary
federal regulatory authority for control of pollution and toxic
chemicals.
III. STRUCTURE
The EPA was actually Nixon’s second choice for an
environmental agency. The initial proposal recommended by his
Council on Executive Reorganization, chaired by Roy Ash, was for a
unified Department of the Environment, pulling together all the
major agencies that had environmental responsibilities, including

5. Frank Gannon, RN in ‘70—Launching the Decade of the Environment (Jan. 1, 2010),
http://thenewnixon.org/2010/01/01/rn-in-70-the-decade-of-the-environment/.
6. Richard M. Nixon, President, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union
(Jan.
22,
1970),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=2921#ixzz1ZpHKDU5P.
7. Richard M. Nixon, President, Special Message to the Congress on Environmental
Quality
(Feb.
10,
1970),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=2757#axzz1ZpHtZNrz.
8. Jack Manning, Mood Is Joyful as City Gives Its Support; Millions Join Earth Day
Observances Across the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1970, at 1.
9. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086.
10. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
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environmental management agencies such as the Forest Service,
Interior Department, and the civilian water management programs of
11
the Army Corps of Engineers. Such an agency could perhaps have
used a far broader range of integrated management and regulatory
policies to manage and protect the environment. Like Franklin
Roosevelt’s proposal for a Department of Conservation in the 1940s,
however, this proposal would have required congressional approval
and faced strong opposition from the traditional constituencies of the
Forest Service and the Corps of Engineers. The proposal for a unified
Department of the Environment was dropped in favor of a mere
reorganization of administrative units already present in the executive
branch, which could be accomplished by presidential fiat: a
presidential reorganization plan did not require congressional
approval, but only that both houses of Congress not act to disapprove
12
it within sixty days.
The EPA was thus created simply by pulling into one new agency
an array of environmental health regulatory and technical assistance
functions, and their associated statutory authorities, that were
13
previously spread across multiple existing agencies. Air pollution
control was transferred from the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, as were environmental health services including solid
waste management, water hygiene, and some radiological health and
environmental control programs; water quality administration was
transferred from the Interior Department, to which it had been
moved from the Public Health Service in the 1960s; pesticide
regulation programs were transferred from the Agriculture, Interior,
and Health, Education, and Welfare departments; radiation
protection standard-setting was transferred from the Atomic Energy
Commission; and ecological systems functions were transferred from
14
the Council on Environmental Quality.
Because EPA was merely the result of a presidential
reorganization plan and not created by legislation, no new powers or
resources were provided. It had no overall “organic act” that would

11. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 315 (1991).
12. RONALD C. MOE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30876, THE PRESIDENT’S
REORGANIZATION AUTHORITY: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, at CRS-4 (2001), available at
http://www.oswego.edu/~ruddy/Educational%20Policy/CRS%20Reports/President’s%20Reorg
anization%20Authority.pdf.
13. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086.
14. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 229.
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authorize its administrator to integrate or set priorities among its
various programs. It was merely a holding company for separate
programs, each continuing to operate under its own separate
statutory authority and budget, and each with its associated
subculture. EPA’s regulatory authority in turn was created or vastly
expanded piecemeal, mainly during the 1970s, a decade that saw the
passage of nearly a dozen major new statutes regulating air pollution,
water pollution, solid and hazardous wastes, drinking water,
15
pesticides, and toxic substances. Although these new statutes added
to the agency’s powers and responsibilities, none of them authorized
EPA to provide overall management of water, air, or land resources,
or even integrated management of pollutant discharges to these
several environmental media. The statutes were even authored and
overseen by several different congressional subcommittees. EPA’s
only formal basis for setting overall priorities was the administrator’s
negotiations with the president and Congress for its annual budget
and appropriations legislation.
In short, EPA was created primarily as a regulatory agency for
specific types of pollutants and environmental contaminants, and
secondarily as a source of federal subsidies for wastewater treatment,
state environmental staffing, and some other purposes. Due to this
emphasis on an adversarial regulatory mission and lack of full
departmental status, it is virtually unique among the environmental
16
ministries of the other industrial democracies. Despite its name,
EPA has never been given broad statutory authority to protect or
manage the environment, to lead U.S. efforts to create an
environmentally sustainable economy, or even to integrate
management of the pollutants it regulates.
Even as a regulatory agency, EPA is something of a hybrid.
Unlike several of the economic regulatory agencies, which are
established as independent commissions and thus designed to
function with primary duty to their statutes and not to White House

15. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Resource
Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227; Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973; Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660
(1974); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976);
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003; Clean Water Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566; Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
16. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 231.
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politics, EPA’s administrator and other senior staff are appointed
17
by—and change with—each president. There have been repeated
legislative proposals since 1988 to elevate EPA to a Cabinet-level
Department of Environmental Protection, but each attempt has failed
in at least one house of the Congress due to unacceptable additions,
such as an amendment mandating risk–cost–benefit analysis of all
regulations or an amendment creating an Office of Environmental
Statistics that would be independent of presidential oversight, among
18
others.
Internally, EPA at its creation had to assimilate a wide range of
disparate subcultures. Air quality and solid waste management, for
instance, had historically been technical assistance programs within
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare rather than
regulatory programs. Water quality was still evolving from a drinkingwater focus in the Public Health Service to greater emphasis on
ambient water quality improvement in Interior. Pesticide regulation
in USDA had been more focused on effectiveness and farmerfriendly technical assistance than on health and environmental
protection. To respond to public demands for more vigorous
environmental protection, and to faithfully carry out EPA’s new
regulatory mandates as they were enacted, its administrators had to
create out of these cultures a more adversarial overall culture of
19
regulatory standard-setting and enforcement.
EPA’s first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, was an
aggressive Republican prosecutor determined to establish EPA’s
credibility and political independence as a regulatory agency that
would be faithful to its statutory mandates and to public expectations
for standard-setting and enforcement, and not subservient to White
House and business politics. In several key cases, he successfully
stood up to White House pressures in enforcing against business
20
supporters of the president. He also created several cross-cutting

17. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086.
18. Philip Shabecoff, House Votes Bill to Elevate E.P.A. to Cabinet Level, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/29/us/house-votes-bill-to-elevate-epa-to-cabinetlevel.html.
19. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 229–32.
20. See J. Patrick Dobel, Managerial Leadership in Divided Times: William Ruckelshaus
and the Paradoxes of Independence, 26 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 488 (1995). As a condition of his
reappointment at the start of Nixon’s second term, Ruckelshaus also demanded and received
control over regulatory initiatives opposed by Nixon’s Office of Management and Budget. Id.;
JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY 117–18, 125–61 (1976).
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functional units within the agency—enforcement, and research and
development, for instance—separate from the air, water, and
21
pesticides units that the agency had inherited. He also created ten
regional offices—often overlooked by the national media, but the
locus of a large fraction of EPA’s staff—where much of EPA’s day22
to-day work is done in cooperation with state agencies.
IV. STATUTORY POWERS AND MANDATES
During the 1970s, bipartisan congressional majorities enacted a
sweeping range of new national environmental regulatory statutes,
most of them signed by Republican presidents. These statutes at face
value gave the EPA an unprecedented range of new powers and
mandates to reduce pollution discharges to air, water, and land, and
to protect the public from the health risks of pesticides and other
toxic chemicals. Taken together, they created a far-reaching new role
for the federal government, establishing a set of national regulatory
frameworks—including direct federal regulation of products sold in
interstate commerce, such as pesticides and motor vehicles, and
others delegated as mandates to be carried out by the states within
frameworks and standards established by EPA—to protect the
environment and public health against the hazards caused by human
wastes and other contaminants.
These statutory powers were of several types. For air quality,
EPA was to set national ambient air quality standards based solely on
health science with an adequate margin of safety, without respect to
the costs of achieving them; the public should be free to travel
throughout the country without risk to their health from polluted
23
air. For new stationary sources of air pollutant emissions and all
point sources of wastewater discharges—generally, industries and
municipal wastewater treatment plants—EPA was to set permit
standards based on the “best available technology,” essentially, the
most effective technologies already in use by the best firms in each
24
industry. For motor vehicles, Congress set technology-forcing

21. ROBERT MCMAHON, The Institutional Structure of the EPA, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: STRUCTURING MOTIVATION IN A GREEN BUREAUCRACY 33, 33–52
(2006).
22. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
24. Id § 7479(3) (defining “best available control technology”); 33 U.S.C. §§
1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2006) (wastewater); Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html (last
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requirements by statute, requiring 90% reduction of tailpipe
25
emissions by 1975. And for drinking water contaminants, hazardous
air pollutants, toxic water pollutants, pesticides, and other toxic
chemicals—potentially thousands of specific substances—EPA was to
set restrictions that balanced the risk of human exposure against the
26
costs and benefits of the proposed restrictions on each substance.
Implementing these statutes represented a Herculean task:
Ruckelshaus once famously compared EPA’s responsibility to
“perform[ing] an appendectomy on yourself while running a hundred27
yard dash.” These statutes were the only tools, however, that
Congress had authorized and directed EPA to use. Congress had
deliberately mandated that EPA set technology-based standards
(“command and control”) because they were easily enforceable—an
inspector had only to determine whether or not the approved
technology was present and functioning properly—and easily
defensible: since the standards were based on technologies already
used by the best firms in each industry, they could not easily be
challenged in court as “impractical.” They also could be implemented
far more quickly than the risk-based statutes, which in contrast placed
a far heavier burden of proof on EPA to prove that a proposed
regulation was both justified and practical, thereby inviting endless
litigation of the science and leading to relatively few substances ever
being fully investigated and regulated. EPA’s risk analyses were often
based on limited scientific knowledge, but under U.S. legal principles
the Agency bore the primary burden of proof to justify regulation,
28
rather than the manufacturer or the supplier to prove their safety.
Within a decade of its creation, EPA thus became arguably the
largest and most powerful environmental agency in the world. In its
29
early years it banned domestic use of DDT, began phasing out lead

updated July 22, 2011); Water: Industry Effluent Guidelines: Frequent Questions, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/questions_index.cfm (last updated
Sept. 29, 2011).
25. Mobile Source Emission—Past, Present, and Future: Milestones, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oms/invntory/overview/solutions/milestones.htm (last updated
July 9, 2007).
26. See supra note 15.
27. As EPA Turns 40, IU Professor Recalls Its Creation, IND. UNIV., http://newsinfo.iu.edu/
news/page/normal/16660.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
28. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 232–37, 242–49.
29. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DDT: A REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF THE DECISION TO BAN ITS USE AS A PESTICIDE 1 (1975), available at http://
www.nal.usda.gov/speccoll/findaids/agentorange/text/01183.pdf.

Andrews_cpcxns (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2011]

THE EPA AT 40: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1/17/2012 2:12 PM

233

30

from gasoline, and began promulgating the wide range of emissions
and contaminant standards mandated by the Clean Air, Clean Water,
and Safe Drinking Water Acts, as well as persuading Congress to pass
31
major amendments to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts in 1977.
By the late 1970s, EPA had substantially reduced pollutant emissions
from electric utilities and industrial smokestacks, industrial and
32
municipal wastewater discharges, and automobiles. It also had ended
open burning of wastes and closed down some 5,000 open dumps,
forcing professionalization of solid waste management and separate
33
tracking and safe disposal of hazardous industrial wastes. In 1978, it
banned nonessential uses of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) due to their
34
damaging effects on stratospheric ozone. Beginning in 1978, EPA
had to tackle cleanup of the disastrous contamination of the Love
Canal site in upstate New York, and in 1980, it began implementing a
massive nationwide cleanup program for “Superfund” sites
35
contaminated by past dumping of toxic chemicals.
For businesses subject to EPA’s regulations, however, a
problematic consequence of this history was that while the air, water,
and solid and hazardous waste statutes were enacted piecemeal over
much of a decade, each statute affected many of the same industrial
processes. The lack of a unified statutory framework, or even a
coherent vision for overall pollution prevention and reduction, meant
that each statute therefore triggered new costs and recalculations of
optimal pollution control strategies. Reducing air pollution at the
smokestack, required in 1970, produced more materials to be
disposed in liquid slurries or landfills. Reducing water pollution,
required in 1972, shifted an even greater burden to landfills. Finally,
the solid and hazardous waste legislation, passed in 1976, dramatically
raised the standards, and thus the costs, for landfill disposal as well.
Moreover, if the statutes were implemented literally and rigorously,

30. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Requires Phase-Out of Lead in All
Grades of Gasoline (Nov. 28, 1973), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lead/03.html.
31. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Clean Water Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
32. J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 56, 69 (1998).
33. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 245–49.
34. Certain Fluorocarbons (Chlorofluorocarbons) in Food, Food Additive, Drug, Animal
Food, Animal Drug, Cosmetic, and Medical Device Products as Propellants in Self-Pressurized
Containers: Prohibition on Use, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (Mar. 17, 1978).
35. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
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achieving ambient air quality standards in areas not already in
compliance with them could in theory require stopping any new
economic growth that would increase pollution—an unachievable
outcome in an area such as southern California, for instance.
V. INNOVATIONS FROM WITHIN
To the agency’s credit, leading administrators within EPA
recognized these problems and proposed innovative solutions to
36
them. Faced with the conundrum of achieving air quality
improvement without closing down regional economies, EPA
Assistant Administrator William Drayton, initially with no clear
statutory authority, proposed a series of more flexible marketoriented policy instruments—emissions offsets and offsets “banking,”
tradable permits, netting and “bubbling” of emissions (treating each
source facility as if under a single “bubble,” rather than requiring best
technology on each stack and vent)—which EPA then persuaded
37
Congress to approve in its 1977 amendments. These were the first of
a far broader range of “market-oriented instruments” which Congress
subsequently approved for EPA use, including tradable production
phasedown quotas for leaded gasoline and chlorofluorocarbons and
ultimately the widely hailed “cap and trade” program under the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments for reducing sulfur and nitrogen
38
emissions from power plants.
By the late 1970s, however, businesses subject to repeated
piecemeal regulation regrouped under an alternative new framing of
the issues: a campaign against overregulation, big government, and
39
bureaucratic zealotry, accompanied by pejorative attacks on

36. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 251.
37. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; DAVID
BORNSTEIN, HOW TO CHANGE THE WORLD: SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND THE POWER OF
NEW IDEAS 53–56 (2004) (discussing Drayton and his “bubble” concept); OFFICE OF POLICY,
ECON., & INNOVATION [OPEI], U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-240-R-01-001, THE UNITED
STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 67,
72–75
(2001),
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B13.pdf/$file/EE-0216B-13.pdf; Laurens H. Rhinelander, The Bubble Concept: A Pragmatic
Approach to Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 1 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 177, 191 (1981).
38. See OPEI, supra note 37.
39. Id. at 255–56. See also MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS
REGULATION (1980). These attacks used longstanding criticisms by economists of the older
economic regulatory programs (airlines, trucking and railroads, telecommunications, electric
generation), several of which were in the process of deregulation at the time, to disparage
environmental, health, and safety regulations as well, despite the significant differences between
economic regulation—which had in practice protected favored businesses from competition—
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environmental regulations as “command and control” and “one size
40
fits all.” In fairness to EPA, these were the statutory tools and
mandates EPA had been given by Congress. Some economists had
proposed more market-oriented environmental policy strategies as
early as the late 1960s, such as Pigovian taxes or even marketable
41
permits, but no strong stakeholder groups advocated for them at the
time. Environmental advocacy groups saw no guaranteed
environmental benefits of taxes and opposed giving the industries a
legal “right to pollute,” while businesses themselves, if they had to be
regulated, preferred certainty and simplicity of clear requirements
binding on all competitors to a tax or marketable permit system that
might cost them more and increase their economic uncertainty.
Ironically, it was during the same period of the late 1970s, as
businesses began to lobby more intensively against environmental
regulation, that leading businesses and business consultants first
began to champion the proposal that “pollution prevention pays.”
Pollution not only causes social costs, but also represents inefficiency
in the businesses themselves: a waste of materials and energy that had
been bought and paid for, and a potential source of increased
financial liability, which could often be corrected to the benefit of the
42
business rather than merely as deadweight costs.
VI. DEREGULATION AND ITS DAMAGE: THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
FOR POLICY REFORM AND INNOVATION
When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, one of his
transition teams made a series of recommendations to him to adopt
and build upon the emerging proposals for market-oriented
instruments to reform environmental policy and promote pollution
43
prevention. These ideas were already beginning to gain traction
and health, safety, and environmental regulation, which protected the public from market
failures such as environmental externalities and tragedies of the commons.
40. Cf. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887. Perhaps ironically, “one size fits all” was once
a positive marketing slogan for socks, not a derogatory label for uniform national standards.
41. See, e.g., J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); Larry Ruff, The
Economic Common Sense of Pollution, 19 PUB. INT. 69, 78–82 (1970).
42. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 262–66; Michael Royston, Making Pollution Prevention
Pay, HARV. L. REV. 6, 6–27 (1980). See also generally MICHAEL ROYSTON, POLLUTION
PREVENTION PAYS (1979).
43. Richard N.L. Andrews, Deregulation: The Failure at EPA, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY IN THE 1980S: REAGAN’S NEW AGENDA 161 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds.,
1984).
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among many opinion leaders. Given Reagan’s personal popularity
and political momentum at the time, combined with the country’s
economic concerns, he could perhaps have achieved significant
reform of EPA’s regulatory mandates toward more moderate,
market-oriented Republican principles.
Instead, however, Reagan adopted the recommendations of a
different transition team which focused on deregulation and proposed
a far more radical agenda: to reverse and roll back the environmental
policies of the previous decade. This team aimed to do so not by
working with Congress to reform or repeal the statutes, but by
administrative fiat. David Stockman, Reagan’s budget director,
warned of a “Republican economic Dunkirk” due to a “ticking
regulatory time bomb” as a torrent of new regulations under
development strangled the economy, and Stockman therefore
44
proposed cuts of more than 11% in EPA’s budget. Reagan himself
announced his intention to “deregulate, defund, and devolve”
45
environmental policymaking to the states. He issued an Executive
Order mandating that the Office of Management and Budget review
all proposed regulations, and directing that no new regulations be
issued unless their economic benefits were shown to exceed their
46
costs. His appointees to head EPA—including Anne Gorsuch (later
Burford) as administrator—were chosen solely for loyalty to this
agenda rather than for any expertise or experience in environmental
protection, and were both isolated from and openly hostile to the
47
Agency’s staff and mission.
The results were disastrous, not only for EPA and its
environmental protection mission, but also for Reagan’s own agenda.
He did succeed in converting the expensive wastewater treatment
grants program to a low-interest loan program, and his budget cuts
severely reduced EPA rulemaking and enforcement, but his attempts
to roll back federal environmental protection regulation—especially
by administrative fiat through hostile and incompetent

44. Dave Stockman, The Stockman Manifesto: The New Budget Director’s Sweeping
Blueprint for President Reagan’s First 100 Days, WASH. POST., Dec. 14, 1980, at C1 (excerpting a
report Stockman wrote for then-President-elect Reagan entitled Avoiding a GOP Economic
Dunkirk).
45. Richard N.L. Andrews, Reform or Reaction?, in ANDREWS, supra note 1, 255, 257;
Robert F. Durant, Hazardous Waste, Regulatory Reform, and the Reagan Revolution: The
Ironies of an Activist Approach to Deactivating Bureaucracy, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 550, 550
(1993).
46. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
47. Andrews, supra note 43, at 166.
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administrators—ignited a firestorm of public and political backlash as
48
well as reversals by the courts. Within three years Reagan found it
necessary to fire sixteen of the top twenty presidential appointees at
EPA, including both the administrator and the deputy administrator,
perhaps the most sweeping mid-course replacement of senior agency
49
staff in U.S. history. At least one appointee, a former industry
lobbyist, went to jail for corruption, while the administrator was cited
50
for contempt of Congress. Reagan found it necessary to persuade
William Ruckelshaus, EPA’s first administrator, to return to EPA as
51
administrator to restore its morale and public credibility.
Reagan himself was reelected in 1984, but the Democrats
regained control of the Congress and passed several tough new
environmental statutes containing “deadline and hammer” clauses:
provisions designed to prevent further administrative undermining of
regulatory statutes by automatically imposing draconian
consequences if EPA did not issue mandated regulations within
52
specified time periods. Ironically, however, these new mandates also
fell most heavily on small businesses and local governments rather
than large corporations, and thus increased friction between EPA and
53
some key constituencies.
With a longer historical perspective, one can look back at
Reagan’s first administration as a tragically missed opportunity and a
fateful turning point in the development of U.S. environmental
protection policy. Rather than championing more market-oriented
reforms and innovations in EPA’s statutes and environmental policy
tools at a moment when opinion leaders were growing receptive to
them and a Republican-led version of them might have been
promoted, Reagan sought to dismantle them, to undermine the
agency itself, and to fundamentally repudiate the federal commitment
to environmental protection by administrative fiat. In doing so, he
severely overreached, shattering the bipartisanship that had largely
characterized environmental policymaking throughout the 1970s. Just

48. Id. at 173–177; Andrews, supra note 45, at 261.
49. Andrews, supra note 43, at 174.
50. Andrews, supra note 45, at 260; Costly Lies: Rita Lavelle is Convicted of Perjury, TIME,
Dec. 12, 1983, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921404,00.html; Obituary,
Anne Burford, 62; Embattled EPA Chief for President Reagan, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2004,
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/22/local/me-burford22.
51. Andrews, supra note 45, at 261.
52. Id. at 261.
53. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 261–62.
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at the moment when Michael Royston and some leading businesses
were pioneering a new vision that pollution prevention could be
profitable, Reagan’s overreach prompted congressional Democrats to
dig in to protect existing statutes against any change. It also pushed
the environmental advocacy organizations to distrust Republican calls
for reform and instead to ally themselves more firmly with
Democratic defenders of the existing statutes and regulatory
programs.
Reagan, in his second term, went on to sign several new
environmental statutes and treaties, such as amendments to the Safe
Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act, a toxics “right-to-know”
law (the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act),
and the Montreal Protocol phasing out production of stratospheric
54
ozone-depleting chemicals (chlorofluorocarbons). He appointed Lee
Thomas, a low-profile career EPA official, as EPA administrator
55
after Ruckelshaus. Thomas’s main contributions included banning
further uses of asbestos, implementing amendments to the Safe
Drinking Water Act and the Superfund program, and sponsoring an
agency-wide, risk-based review of EPA’s programs and priorities,
seeking to make the case for clearer prioritization of environmental
56
hazards. Critics, however, also attacked EPA during this period for
failing to more aggressively regulate risks which were already within
its jurisdiction, such as pesticide and lead exposure and contaminants
57
in drinking water.
Reagan’s initial radicalism, however, had opened and
exacerbated a deep ideological fault line between support for
environmental protection and hostility to the federal government, a
division which would increasingly be exploited for partisan advantage
by Newt Gingrich in 1994, by George W. Bush during his presidency,
and by others. In principle, there is every reason to believe that a

54. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-359, 100 Stat. 642;
Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 100 Stat. 7; Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1733; Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
55. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Lee M. Thomas Biography (Nov. 29, 1984),
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/admin/agency/thomas.html.
56. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 268–70; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-230-2-87-025a,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
(1987).
57. See, e.g., Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 U.S. 1361 (1993);
Am. Water Works Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (decided on
petitioners’ challenges to EPA regulations initially proposed in 1988 on lead in drinking water).
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healthy environment is compatible with and even necessary to a
healthy economy, and that while this requires some clear roles for
government, more market-oriented policy innovations could achieve
both environmental and economic benefits more effectively than the
mere continuation of the regulatory statutes of the 1970s. By
attempting to dismantle those statutes rather than reform them,
however, and by re-framing the issue as government over-regulation
rather than environmental protection, Reagan and his successors held
EPA and its environmental policy mandates hostage to a broader
ideological battle between the most entrenched interests in both the
business and environmental advocacy communities, and between
Republican and Democratic strategists seeking partisan advantage.
This false dichotomy continues to stalemate environmental policy
reform and innovation more than a quarter century later.
The more aggressive anti-regulatory organizations, meanwhile,
refocused their attention on attacking the scientific justifications for
EPA’s risk-based regulations. Throughout the late 1980s and early
1990s, EPA’s regulatory proposals were constantly attacked in the
news media, the courts, and quasi-academic books as being based on
58
“junk science.”
In response to this increased politicization of EPA’s scientific
and rulemaking processes, both EPA and environmental advocacy
groups began seeking more self-enforcing incentives that could
promote environmental protection without the staff-intensive and
time-consuming burdens of EPA’s regulatory process. An early
precursor was the strict joint and several liability provision in the
Superfund Act of 1980, which created the threat of severe economic
consequences for any business that had dumped hazardous waste into
59
contaminated sites. In 1986, after the Bhopal industrial disaster—in
which large numbers of people were killed or sickened by toxic
chemicals leaking from an American-operated pesticide factory in
India—Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act, which required businesses to disclose and EPA to
publicly list the annual quantities of toxic chemicals they used and
60
any leaks or releases of them into the environment. Direct public
pressure would thus become a complement or alternative to EPA
regulation. Similarly, as naturally occurring radon became recognized

58. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 277–80 and accompanying notes and references.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006).
60. Id. §§ 11002–03.
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as a hazard in some homes and public buildings, rather than regulate
it directly EPA was authorized in 1988 to set scientifically-based
radon action levels and provide technical assistance for state radon
inspection programs, thus letting property sale negotiations serve as
61
an alternative to regulation.
VII. RECLAIMING THE ISSUE: GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND EPA
ADMINISTRATOR BILL REILLY
In 1988, George H.W. Bush was elected president. His campaign
capitalized on his position as Reagan’s vice president, but also
differentiated him as a pro-environment candidate. Bush was by then
a Texan, but from a moderate and patrician New England Republican
background, and one suspects that he sought for both personal and
political reasons to try to reaffirm and reclaim a Republican version
of the environmental policy agenda from the partisan polarization to
which it had become hostage. Described by one source as
“conservative on the size of government but progressive and in favor
62
of more action on environmental protection,” he ran on promises to
strengthen the Clean Air Act and to achieve “no net loss” of
wetlands, and in public speeches he emphasized the increasingly
63
global nature of environmental hazards. He appointed William
Reilly as his EPA administrator, a Republican moderate who was
deeply knowledgeable about environmental science and policy, and
widely respected by both Republicans and Democrats, as well as by
businesses and environmental advocacy groups. Reilly also enjoyed
with Bush the closest personal relationship that any EPA
administrator has had with their president.
Under Reilly’s leadership, EPA’s senior managers and Science
Advisory Board followed through on Lee Thomas’s Unfinished
Business risk priorities study with a wide-ranging attempt to examine
and recommend changes in the agency’s priorities, based on the
“relative risks” of all the present and potential environmental issues
61. The Indoor Radon Abatement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C § 2665 (2006).
62. KATHY MCCAULEY ET AL., CROSSING THE AISLE TO CLEANER AIR: HOW THE
BIPARTISAN “PROJECT 88” TRANSFORMED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 19 (2008), available at
http://www.iop.pitt.edu/documents/casestudies/Crossing%20the%20Aisle%20to%20Cleaner%2
0Air.pdf.
63. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVTL. POLICY, PROTECTING AMERICA’S WETLANDS: A
FAIR,
FLEXIBLE,
AND
EFFECTIVE
APPROACH
(1993),
available
at
http://
www.wetlands.com/fed/aug93wet.htm (no net loss); George Herbert Walker Bush, President,
Speech at Helena, Mont. (1989), available at http://www.rep.org/news/GEvol8/
ge8.1_Bush41.html.
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within its sphere of responsibility. They concluded, for instance, that
hazardous waste cleanups were significantly overfunded compared to
more serious hazards to public health and the environment such as
64
climate change. Reilly’s goal was to try to persuade Congress to
allow EPA to manage, innovate, and change based on risk priorities
across its programs, and to address new hazards as they arose, rather
than just continue to implement the statutory and judicial mandates
of the 1970s. Reilly’s EPA also endeavored to demonstrate EPA’s
commitment to science-based priorities in response to “junk science”
65
claims by opponents of its regulatory initiatives. Unfortunately, most
of these priority changes could not be implemented without
congressional approval and Congress itself was too fragmented both
by partisanship and by separate subcommittees to approve them. The
report thus did not have as much impact on policies and priorities as
was hoped.
A crowning environmental achievement of the George H.W.
Bush administration, however, was the passage of the landmark
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 with their pioneering “cap and
trade” innovation in air pollution control. This statute set stringent
caps on total sulfur and nitrogen emissions from the nation’s electric
power plants and authorized the EPA to issue tradable allowances
that the utilities could either use themselves or sell to others if they
66
could reduce their own emissions more cheaply. Environmental
groups had long been skeptical of such “rights to pollute,” as had
many traditionalist EPA regulators, but it proved to be the single
most successful policy to date in effectively and significantly reducing
67
air pollution emissions. It also became the exemplar for subsequent
cap-and-trade proposals, including the European Union carbon68
trading scheme devised under the Kyoto Protocol —despite
nonparticipation by the U.S.—and a greenhouse-gas reduction bill

64. U.S. ENVTL. PROT, AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND
STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 13 (1990). http://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/28704D9C420FCBC1852573360053C692/$File/REDUCING+RISK++++++
++++EC-90-021_90021_5-11-1995_204.pdf
65. Leslie Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA, 249 SCIENCE 616 (1990).
66. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
67. David Malakoff, Taking the Sting Out of Acid Rain, 330 SCIENCE 910 (2010).
68. William B. Bonvillian, Time for Climate Plan B, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. ONLINE, Winter
2011, http://www.issues.org/27.2/bonvillian.html (noting that permit-trading mechanism of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 was brought by the United States to Kyoto).
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69

which passed the U.S. House in 2009 but failed in the Senate. The
1990 amendments also included other aggressive air pollution control
policies, including technology-based requirements for reducing
hazardous air pollutant emissions and a “bump-up” provision
subjecting states that were not complying with the national ambient
air quality standards to automatically more stringent and costly
70
consequences.
Reilly also exacted a $1 billion settlement from the Exxon
Corporation for its Exxon Valdez oil spill in the Gulf of Alaska—the
largest environmental criminal damage settlement in history up to
71
that point. But without additional statutory authority such as the
1990 CAA cap-and-trade program, EPA could not promulgate
alternative market-oriented tools such as environmental taxes and
72
fees or cap-and-trade systems.
In the absence of congressional support for additional initiatives,
therefore, the EPA under Reilly initiated a wide range of voluntary
programs to promote and reward positive environmental initiatives
and best practices by leading businesses, in hopes of making them
models for others. One example was the 33/50 program, which
challenged businesses to reduce their use of toxic chemicals by 33%
73
by 1992 and 50% by 1995 against a 1988 baseline. Another was the
Energy Star program, which offered a positive environmental label—
first for personal computers and monitors, later for all types of
69. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (titled the American Clean Energy and Security
Act, and also known as the Waxman-Markey bill, after its sponsors); Penny Crossman, Is
Carbon Trading the Next Big Thing?, WALL STREET & TECH. (July 19, 2009), http://
www.wallstreetandtech.com/electronic-trading/218501208 (noting that the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 introduced the first national cap-and-trade program in the world and
connecting that development to the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009).
70. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §§ 301–06 (Title III, Hazardous Air Pollutants);
id. § 179, 104 Stat. 2420.
71. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exxon to Pay Record One Billion Dollars in
Criminal Fines and Civil Damages in Connection with Alaskan Oil Spill (March 13, 1991),
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/valdez/02.html.
72. One of its most significant recent innovations, for instance, the 2005 Clean Air
Interstate Rule, which would have created an emissions-reduction cap and permit market for
sulfur and nitrogen emissions across the whole eastern half of the country, was remanded to the
Agency by a court decision as lacking statutory authority (although left in place pending
refinements), even though it would probably have greatly benefited economic efficiency in
industries as well as cleaner air. See JOHN GRAHAM, BUSH ON THE HOME FRONT 209 (2010). It
was subsequently replaced in 2011 by the even stronger Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
(CSAPR). 76 Fed. Reg. 48208, August 8, 2011.
73. DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 134 (2006); U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-745-R-99-004, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 1 (1999),
available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/3350-fnl.pdf.
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appliances and even for homes—affirming that the labeled product
74
uses significantly less energy than comparable alternative products.
One final environmental outcome of George H.W. Bush’s
presidency was the adoption of the United Nations Framework
75
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which Bush signed and
the U.S. Senate ratified in 1992, although only after the Bush
administration had successfully insisted on removing from it all
76
binding targets. Often overlooked in favor of its more contentious
sequel, the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC did not include binding
greenhouse gas reduction targets, but it did explicitly commit the U.S.
to acknowledgement of global warming as a serious environmental
threat and of the responsibility of the industrialized countries to take
the lead in reducing it. It thus provided an important basis, in addition
to the Clean Air Act itself, for EPA’s responsibility to address this
issue. Reilly was not able, however, to persuade Bush to sign the
international convention on biodiversity; and other pledges such as no
net loss of wetlands also have never been fully achieved.
VIII. PARTISAN “SWINGS OF THE PENDULUM”
Bush’s loss in 1992 to Bill Clinton and the outspoken
environmental champion Al Gore probably reconfirmed in the minds
of Republican politicians the likelihood that Democratic candidates
would always have an advantage over Republicans on environmental
issues. This led Republican strategists instead to redouble their
determination to change the subject, to reframe the issues as
opposition to big government and burdensome federal regulation
and, in the process, attract major campaign funding from businesses
opposed to environmental regulations. Both Newt Gingrich and the
Republican congressional insurgents in 1994 followed this course, as
did President George W. Bush with Vice President Dick Cheney from
2000 to 2008.

74. Will Nixon, Uncle Sam’s Green Wallet: Will Federal Spending Support Environmental
Technologies?, E: THE ENVTL. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1993, at 24 (describing the early Energy Star
program, which involved only 13 computer manufacturers); Major Milestones,
ENERGYSTAR.GOV, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_milestones (last visited
Sept. 10, 2011).
75. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
76. Michael Weisskopf, Bush Was Aloof in Warming Debate; Climate Treaty Offers View
of President’s Role in Complex Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1992, at A1.
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Clinton himself was more a centrist than a committed
environmentalist at the outset of his presidency, although he did take
several early environmental initiatives. He sought early on to elevate
EPA to the status of a Cabinet department, for instance, but this
legislative proposal failed due to the addition of amendments in the
House and Senate by conservative opponents of the bill. The House
amendment—proposed by Representatives Mica, a Republican, and
Thurman, a Democrat—would have required EPA to conduct cost–
benefit analyses and risk assessments on all rules it imposed on local
governments. Supporters of the amendment lauded it as a way of
77
reducing unfunded mandates. A similar amendment to the Senate
version of the bill was proposed by Democratic Senator J. Bennett
78
Johnston. The amendments were unacceptable to environmental
79
advocates of the legislation.
Clinton also sought early on to create nonpartisan, multistakeholder processes to negotiate solutions to thorny environmental
issues. Early in his presidency, he sponsored several high-profile
negotiation processes to try to resolve environmental controversies
such as the water quality protection for the Everglades; the oldgrowth forests of the Pacific Northwest; and habitat conservation
80
agreements for endangered species.
This attempt to foster a spirit of multi-stakeholder negotiation
for environmental issues was, in effect, rebuffed by the midterm
elections in 1994, in which a strongly ideological, anti-government
Republican insurgency led by Newt Gingrich took control of
81
Congress.
Gingrich and his fellow Republican candidates
77. Gary Lee, House Leaders Defer Vote on Cabinet Rank for EPA; GOP Opposition to
Clinton Measure Growing, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1993, at A4 (describing both the proposal and
the cost-benefit amendment intended to stymie it); Mary-Margaret Larmouth, Cities Flex
Muscles on Mandates, NATION’S CITIES WKLY., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1.
78. See Janet O. Wiener, Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analyses: In the Public
Interest?, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 408 (1993).
79. See, e.g., Mike Mills, EPA Cabinet Measure Hits Snag over Amendment, CONG. Q.
WKLY., Feb. 5, 1994, at 241 (quoting the chief legal counsel of the National Audubon Society as
saying that the amendment, and the necessity of pulling the bill altogether, was “very
disappointing”). See also Wiener, supra note 78, at 409 (“Most environmental groups oppose all
forms of risk assessment legislation . . . . The National Wildlife Federation says the Johnston
[amendment] would ‘add a costly new layer of bureaucracy that will delay important
environmental regulations.’ David Driesen of the Natural Resources Defense Council says that
‘while comparative risk analysis sounds attractive in theory, it doesn’t work very well in practice
and has sometimes paralyzed environmental programs.’ . . . Rick Hinds of Greenpeace says ‘risk
assessment is a voodoo science of politicians to let pollution occur.’”)
80. ANDREWS, supra note 1, 350–59.
81. Id.
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campaigned on a platform widely advertised as a “Contract with
America,” in which the intent to vigorously attack environmental
regulation was masked by almost Orwellian language; the bill was
82
called the “Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act.”
Once faced with an outspokenly anti-environmental Congress
after 1994, Clinton defined himself as a far stronger champion of
environmental protection, thereby gaining support from the public—
with the exceptions of regulated industries and Western public land
83
users—at the expense of the Republican insurgents.
For EPA administrator, Clinton appointed Carol Browner,
former Secretary of Florida’s Department of Environmental
84
Regulation and former legislative director to then-Senator Al Gore.
Browner brought to the EPA an aggressive commitment to tough
rulemaking and regulatory enforcement for environmental health
protection, and became the longest-serving administrator in EPA’s
85
history, holding the position from 1993 to 2001. During her tenure,
she reorganized EPA’s enforcement programs into a single Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assistance, and promoted several
initiatives to negotiate pollution prevention partnerships with key
industrial sectors, including Project XL and the Common Sense
Initiative, both elements of Clinton’s “Reinventing Government”
86
effort. With Clinton’s support she also established new initiatives at
87
EPA on children’s environmental health and environmental justice.

82. Despite its title, the content of this proposed legislation consisted primarily of
proposals requiring risk assessments and cost–benefit analyses for all major environmental
regulations, specifying in detail how such assessments were to be conducted, setting an overall
“regulatory budget” for the maximum cost of all new regulations in a given year (without
respect to their benefits), requiring detailed “regulatory impact assessments,” and mandating
compensation for any reduction in property value resulting from limitation of its use by federal
regulation, among other mandates. See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, S.
6221, 104th Cong. (1995).
83. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 351–59.
84. Carol M. Browner: Biography, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 1998), http://
www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/admin/agency/browner.html [hereinafter Browner Biography].
85. Press Release, League of Conservation Voters, League of Conservation Voters
Welcomes Carol Browner to the Board of Directors (June 23, 2011), available at
http://www.lcv.org/media/press-releases/League-of-Conservation-Voters-Welcomes-CarolBrowner-to-the-Board-of-Directors.html.
86. Carol M. Browner, Foreword: The Role of Private Parties in Resolving Public
Problems, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 447, 449–50 (1997); SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W.
WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 221 (1996).
87. Exec. Order 12,898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994); Exec. Order
13,045: Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks, 62 Fed. Reg.
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In addition, she successfully fought off attempts by the 1994
88
Republican Congress to roll back EPA’s regulatory powers.
Browner also began EPA’s successful program to revitalize
89
contaminated “brownfield” sites, and skillfully and successfully
championed tightening of federal air quality standards for groundlevel ozone and particulates as well as for emissions from light trucks
90
and sport utility vehicles. Finally, she began to lay the foundations
for EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, despite bipartisan
congressional opposition to any U.S. climate change action that did
not include binding commitments by rapidly industrializing countries
91
such as China. The few bipartisan successes of this era were 1996
pre-election amendments to the Food and Drug Act; amendments
that abolished the “Delaney Amendment,” which had prohibited any
carcinogenic additives in food, and in exchange required toxicity
92
testing for additives’ effects on children as well as adults; and
93
amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act. Some Republicans
from Northeastern downwind states also supported the more
94
stringent ozone and particulate standards.
Browner’s emphasis on strict enforcement, however, was
particularly controversial with respect to “new source review” (NSR),
the requirement that pre-existing industrial sources of air pollution
upgrade to technology that met the tougher Clean Air Act standards
95
for new sources whenever they underwent major modifications.
Electric utilities in particular preferred to manage these older sources
under the “cap and trade” scheme of the 1990 Clean Air Act, which
19,885, 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1993 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/reports/annualproject-reports/ej_annual_report_1993.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE EPA
CHILDREN’S ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH YEARBOOK (1998), available at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/pdf5.htm/%24File/ochpyearbook.pdf.
88. Browner Biography, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. John H. Cushman Jr., On Clean Air, Environmental Chief Fought Doggedly, and Won,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/05/us/on-clean-air-environmentalchief-fought-doggedly-and-won.html; Warren Brown & Martha Hamilton, EPA to Require
Cleaner Fuels; Light Trucks, SUVs Must Meet Same Emission Standard as Cars, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 1999, at A1.
91. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
92. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 358.
93. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613.
94. Cushman, supra note 90.
95. Peter Van Doren & Jerry Taylor, Congress vs. Responsibility: New Source Review
Problems Are on Capitol Hill, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2003, http://old.nationalreview.com/
comment/vandorentaylor200312080926.asp.
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only regulated total emissions rather than requiring strict compliance
by every facility. Strict NSR enforcement, from the perspective of the
utilities, undermined the more flexible cap-and-trade system and was
far more costly. From the perspective of Browner’s enforcement
office, however, some utilities had been flouting the NSR
requirement for years, continuing to upgrade old coal-fired power
plants and use them more intensively without installing the best
available technology as mandated by the original Clean Air Act.
Browner’s EPA filed 51 enforcement suits over this issue in the
closing years of the Clinton administration, most of them against coal96
fired power plants. Her aggressive enforcement stance on this issue
led many industries to support George W. Bush for election in 2000
over Al Gore and to lobby for more aggressive Republican initiatives
97
to rein in EPA.
IX. ANOTHER ANTI-REGULATORY ERA: EPA UNDER GEORGE W.
BUSH
The 2000 presidential election clearly reconfirmed environmental
protection as a partisan issue, with high-profile environmental
champion Al Gore as the Democratic nominee and George W. Bush,
heavily supported by industries that were chafing under the Clinton
EPA’s aggressive regulatory and enforcement policies, as the
Republican candidate. Bush had made a campaign pledge to require
all power plants to meet federal standards for carbon dioxide as well
as sulfur, nitrogen and mercury, but once in office, he both withdrew
the U.S. from participation in international greenhouse gas reduction
negotiations and reversed his pledge to regulate carbon dioxide
98
emissions.
The Bush administration’s record at EPA was, with a few
important exceptions, one of the low points of the agency’s history.
Bush’s first appointee as EPA administrator was Christine Todd
99
Whitman, the moderate Republican governor of New Jersey. In
retrospect, Whitman’s appointment appears to have been a token
appointment of a woman from the moderate Northeastern wing of
the Republican Party. Whitman resigned within two years after being
96. GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 201.
97. Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/magazine/04BUSH.html?pagewanted=all.
98. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 360–61.
99. Christine Todd Whitman: Biography, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2001), http://
www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/admin/agency/whitman.html.
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repeatedly undercut by the White House when defending and seeking
100
to carry out what she had taken as his campaign commitments.
Whitman was followed as administrator by Michael Leavitt, a former
governor of Utah who had been considered an effective
environmental manager at the state level and soon went on to
101
become Secretary of Health and Human Services. Leavitt was
succeeded by Stephen Johnson, a career professional from within
EPA who proved to be more a malleable subordinate for the White
House’s policies than a strong independent administrator in the
102
tradition of Ruckelshaus.
During Administrator Leavitt’s tenure, the agency strengthened
its standards for ozone and other air pollutants and, in particular,
implemented tougher standards for diesel emissions from both onand off-road vehicles—the former begun under the Clinton
103
administration—a major new step forward in air pollution control.
In 2005, EPA introduced the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), a
pathbreaking proposal, albeit with controversial timelines, to create a
cap-and-trade system for sulfur and nitrogen emissions covering the
104
entire eastern half of the country. CAIR was remanded to the EPA
by the courts for refinements needed to pass judicial scrutiny, but was
105
left in place in the meantime. A controversial rule on reducing
mercury emissions from power plants, called the Clean Air Mercury

100. The immediate reason for her resignation, as she confirmed in a later interview, was
being directed by Vice President Dick Cheney to essentially exempt old coal-fired power plants
from new source review requirements, a policy change that was later overturned by the courts.
See Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at A1.
Whitman subsequently authored a poignant book entitled It’s My Party, Too, lamenting the
Republican Party’s abdication of commitment to environmental issues. CHRISTINE TODD
WHITMAN, IT’S MY PARTY, TOO: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF THE GOP AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA (2005).
101. Biography of Mike Leavitt, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.¸ http://
www.hhs.gov/secretary/dhhssec.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
102. Cf. John Shiffman & John Sullivan, An Eroding Mission at EPA, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 7, 2008, http://articles.philly.com/2008-12-07/news/24992895_1_climate-change-climatechange-deputy-administrator-jason-burnett.
103. Michael Janofsky, New EPA Rules to Cut Diesel Soot / Regulations for Nonroad
Vehicles Require Cleaner Fuel, Slashing Emissions by 90%, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2004,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-05-11/news/17424399_1_diesel-fuel-new-diesel-trucks-that-usediesel.
104. Clean Air Interstate Rule: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/cair/basic.html (last updated July 9, 2010).
105. North Carolina v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-1244 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2008)
(order remanding CAIR to EPA without vacatur). See also GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 207–09.
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106

Rule, was also proposed. Positive features of the proposed rule
would have included a permanent nationwide cap on total mercury
emissions, but this approach would also have left open the risk of
“hot spots” of toxic pollution at some facilities and unacceptably long
107
compliance deadlines. This proposal too was overturned by the
108
courts. EPA also introduced a vigorous program for cleaning up
contaminated “brownfields” sites and stepped up the Energy Star
109
voluntary energy efficiency certification program.
On other important issues, however, Bush’s EPA was dominated
by White House pressure against strong environmental regulation,
especially of the fossil fuel industries and their users. Led by Vice
President Dick Cheney and the Interior Department, the Bush
administration pursued aggressive policies of accelerated oil and gas
leasing throughout the public lands and promoted new investments in
110
coal production and use.
EPA enforcement actions dropped
111
dramatically. In 2002 EPA issued a highly controversial new
interpretation of the NSR regulations that would, in effect,
permanently exempt old “grandfathered” industrial air polluters from
ever having to upgrade to modern air pollution standards; this policy

106. Clean Air Mercury Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
oar/mercuryrule/ (last updated Mar. 16, 2011).
107. Regulating mercury as a hazardous air pollutant under section 112 of the Clean Air
Act could be done immediately using known control technologies; the proposed EPA Clean Air
Mercury Rule would instead have introduced a two-phase cap-and-trade program that would
not be fully mandatory until 2018, with full reductions not expected until 2026. Nine States Sue
EPA Seeking Tougher Mercury Rule,
ENV’T NEWS SERV. http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/mar2005/2005-03-31-03.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2011); Fact Sheet: EPA’s
Clean
Air
Mercury
Rule,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oar/mercuryrule/factsheetfin.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2011); OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2006-P-00025, MONITORING NEEDED TO
ASSESS IMPACT OF EPA’S CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE ON POTENTIAL HOTSPOTS (2006),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060515-2006-P-00025.pdf.
108. New Jersey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the
Clean Air Mercury Rule). See also GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 210–14.
109. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 379.
110. According to Graham, by 2004 the Department of Energy projected that the U.S.
would have built 72 new coal-fired power plants, compared to zero projected in 1999; and by
2006 another 100 plants were under consideration, although by 2008 these numbers had been
significantly reduced due to public backlash, lawsuits, and rising construction costs. GRAHAM,
supra note 72, at 136–37.
111. Seth Borenstein, Pollution Citations Plummet under Bush, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 9,
2003,
http://articles.philly.com/2003-12-09/news/25469611_1_epa-administrator-mike-leavittbush-epa-pollution-citations.
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112

was subsequently overturned by the courts. In Appalachia, the Bush
EPA approved rules that reversed Clean Water Act restrictions on
dumping mine waste into streams, now allowing such dumping so
long as harm was minimized “to the extent practicable” and was
113
compensated for somewhere else. And the Bush administration
tightened standards for motor vehicle fuel efficiency only marginally,
114
far less than needed to have significant benefits.
On climate change, Bush withdrew the U.S. from participation in
international climate change negotiations and personally dismissed a
major EPA scientific report on climate change as just another “report
115
put out by the bureaucracy.” The climate change section of EPA’s
scientific Draft Report on the Environment, released in 2003, was
116
heavily edited by a former industry lobbyist in the Executive Office
and ultimately withheld by Administrator Whitman rather than being
117
published in politically edited form. Many other EPA reports were
118
also said to have been subjected to political editing. EPA’s legal
112. GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 201–04; KIM CONNOLLY & VICTOR FLATT, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, ‘GRANDFATHERED’ AIR POLLUTION SOURCES AND POLLUTION
CONTROL: NEW SOURCE REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2005), available at http://
www.progressivereform.org/articles/NSR_504.pdf
113. Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and Buffers for Perennial and Intermittent Streams, 73
Fed. Reg. 75, 814, 75,814 (Dec. 12, 2008); Juliet Eilperin, EPA to Scrutinize Permits for
Mountaintop-Removal Mining, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032401607.html; Deborah Zaborenko, EPA Eases
Rule on Mountaintop Coal Mining Debris, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/03/us-coal-mountaintop-idUSTRE4B267F20081203.
114. The mileage standards announced in March 2006 would have required an increase in
the average fuel economy for passenger trucks only from 22.2 miles per gallon to 23.5 miles per
gallon by 2010. Court Throws Out Bush Fuel Economy Standards, ENVTL. NEWS SERV., Nov.
16, 2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/nov2007/2007-11-16-02.html. Bush did subsequently
propose a standard of 34 mpg for cars and light trucks by 2017, but did not implement this in
regulations before the end of his term. John Hughes & Roger Runningen, Bush Plans Rules to
Boost Auto Fuel-Economy Standards (Update 1), BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 14, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVMYPLuwm.LU&refer=home;
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Statement on Corporate Fuel Economy Standards Finalization (Jan. 7,
2009), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0109.htm.
115. Lloyd De Vries, Bush Disses Global Warming Report, CBS NEWS, June 4, 2002,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/03/tech/main510920.shtml.
116. Philip Cooney, formerly of the American Petroleum Institute, then chief of staff of the
president’s Council on Environmental Quality; subsequently employed by ExxonMobil. See
Jarrett Murphy, White House Guts Global Warming Study, CBS NEWS, June 19, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/24/politics/main564873.shtml.
117. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 381.
118. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 600-R-03-050, EPA’s DRAFT REPORT ON THE
ENVIRONMENT TECHNICAL DOCUMENT (2003). For additional examples, see UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: AN INVESTIGATION INTO
THE
BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S
MISUSE
OF
SCIENCE
(2004),
available
at
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office went on to issue a ruling asserting that the agency did not even
have legal authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the
119
Clean Air Act, a ruling later rejected by the courts and reversed by
120
the Obama administration. Additionally, Administrator Stephen
Johnson denied California’s request for a waiver allowing it to
regulate tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases, an action that also
121
was subsequently challenged in the courts.
X. REAFFIRMATION OF EPA’S MISSION: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
Since January 2009, the Obama administration has once again
put highly experienced and committed regulators in charge of EPA.
The agency is currently led by Administrator Lisa Jackson, a chemical
engineer and former Commissioner of New Jersey’s Department of
122
Environmental Protection and, before that, a 16-year EPA veteran.
Jackson’s stated goal has been to “restore momentum to EPA’s core
programs—healthier air and water, and reduced risks from toxic
substances—while also tackling emerging challenges such as climate
123
change.” In her first two years, she reversed the Bush EPA’s

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/rsi_final_fullreport_1.pdf; UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: FURTHER
INVESTIGATION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF SCIENCE (2004), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/scientific_integrity_in_policy_makin
g_july_2004_1.pdf; and U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM—MINORITY STAFF, POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2003),
available at http://it.stlawu.edu/~vleh/Bush%20Politics%20Science.pdf.
119. Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The decision overruled
the Bush EPA’s position, holding that the Clean Air Act did indeed authorize it to regulate
tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases as hazards to the public health and welfare.
120. Acting on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
at 497, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson issued findings that greenhouse gases were a threat to
public health and welfare, and that tailpipe emissions contribute to this threat. Proposed
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Finding for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a)
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009).
121. California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 07-1457, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29095
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2007); California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of
Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent
Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156
(Mar. 6, 2008); Press Release, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gov. Schwarzenegger
Announces Intent to Appeal Denial of California’s Tailpipe Emissions Waiver Request (Dec.
20, 2007), available at http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/newsroom/docs/SchwarzAppeal-12-20-07.pdf.
122. Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
aboutepa/administrator.html (last updated June 15, 2011).
123. Progress Report, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 29, 2009), http://epa.gov/progress/.
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position on climate change, agreeing with the Supreme Court that
EPA has both the authority and the responsibility to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, and issued draft regulations to begin that
process as well as creating a mandatory greenhouse gas reporting
124
registry for all major sources. She also issued draft regulations
restricting mercury emissions from cement kilns and coal-fired power
125
plants. In 2010, she severely tightened standards for mountaintopmining impacts on water quality, and, in 2011, for the first time,
126
cancelled a major mountaintop-mining permit,
telegraphing a
significantly stronger position on the Clean Water Act’s mandate to
protect water quality. After a significant spill from a coal ash storage
pond, she proposed more stringent new regulations on coal ash
127
disposal as well. Finally, she administered a major increase in
funding under the Obama Administration’s economic recovery
stimulus funding—the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—
for a wide range of initiatives, including community drinking-water
and water-quality infrastructure projects, brownfield restoration
initiatives, additional Superfund site and underground storage tank
128
cleanups, and diesel emission reduction investments.
Taken as a whole, many of these policies represented a
particularly strong reversal of the Bush administration’s policies
promoting the coal industry, significantly raising the cost of coal to
reflect more of its full environmental costs and thus reducing its
advantage relative to environmentally more benign renewable energy
sources.

124. See supra note 120.
125. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Sets First National Limits to Reduce
Mercury and Other Toxic Emissions from Cement Plants (Aug. 9, 2010), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e77fdd4f5afd88a3852576b3005a604f/ef62ba1cb3c8079
b8525777a005af9a5!OpenDocument; Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) for Power
Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/ (last
updated July 28, 2011).
126. John M. Broder, Agency Revokes Permit for Major Coal Mining Project, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/science/earth/14coal.html?pagewanted=all;
Kris Maher & Siobhan Hughes, EPA Toughens Mining Permits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303960604575158032996638508.html..
127. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128
(June 21, 2010). As of October 2011, the rule had not yet been finalized.
128. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE REPORT, CUMULATIVE RESULTS AS OF JUNE 30, 2011 (2011),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/recovery/pdfs/ARRA-FY11-Quarter-3-PerformanceReport.pdf.
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As a pattern, these policies also represented a dramatic new
“swing of the pendulum” from the laxity of the Bush administration
back toward a more vigorous rulemaking and enforcement policy for
environmental protection. With the election of a far more strongly
anti-government, Republican-led House of Representatives in 2010,
however, the new majority, including some Democrats from fossilfuel-dependent states, threatened legislation to limit EPA’s powers to
carry out many of these proposals or, failing that, to hamstring the
129
agency through budget cuts and constant oversight hearings. Only
time will tell which if any of these measures will be approved by the
Senate and the president, and when and on what issues, if any, a
working bipartisan consensus can be achieved on strong and stable
environmental performance expectations.
XI. DISCUSSION
In short, EPA at 40 has accomplished a great deal and has
generated proposals for a variety of further innovations, but remains
fundamentally constrained within the regulatory frameworks and
fragmented authorities of the 1970s due to the loss of bipartisanship,
trust and shared commitment to its mission among the members and
factions of Congress. EPA has significantly improved the overall
quality of the air we breathe, vastly improved waste management
practices, removed lead and stratospheric ozone-depleting chemicals
from the air and significantly reduced pollution discharges from point
130
sources into both air and water. It also has attempted to generate
innovative methods to improve both economic efficiency and
environmental outcomes, such as emissions trading. However, these
successes are highly imperfect and vulnerable to changes in
administration. The agency still does not have an overarching
framework of authority and tools to protect the environment and set
priorities more generally, let alone a broader mission to help achieve
an economy that is environmentally sustainable.

129. U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS—DEMOCRATS, LEGISLATIVE RIDERS
FUNDING LIMITATIONS IN H.R. 2584 INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENT, AND RELATED
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, FY12 (2011), http://democrats.appropriations.house.gov/images/
Special_Interest_List_Interior_Appropriations.pdf; House GOP Passes Bill Targeting EPA
Regulations, FOX NEWS, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/23/house-goppasses-bill-targeting-epa-regulations/.
130. See generally J.C. DAVIES & J. MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998).
AND
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As a result, important threats to the environment remain
unsolved and unmanaged. Among the most obvious examples are
water pollution from non-point sources, aggregate motor vehicle
emissions, grandfathered pre-existing power plants and industrial
facilities, wetland destruction and continued urbanization of other
ecologically valuable natural lands, continuing uncertainty over
whether Congress will undercut its nascent regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions, and the absence of effective approaches to new hazards
such as nanomaterials.
Despite perennial calls for better science, EPA’s risk-based
regulatory programs have ironically been among its least effective,
largely because they are vulnerable to unending debate and
politicization of the assumptions used in the science itself.
Politically, as a regulatory agency, EPA’s most active
constituencies are those businesses that would be most affected by its
regulations, particularly those that would be required to retrofit
existing facilities to comply with new regulations and are seeking to
avoid the costs of change. EPA’s constituencies also include firms
that benefit from its regulations, such as emissions-control equipment
manufacturers and the ethanol industry, but also more generally,
those businesses that simply want to maintain the status quo,
including those that have already litigated the existing regulations and
invested in complying with them and do not want competitors to
escape these costs. These businesses are implicitly allies of
environmental groups protecting the status quo, but not necessarily of
those seeking more efficient or more effective reforms.
The main constituencies in favor of EPA’s mission of more
effective environmental protection include a few organized
environmental advocacy groups who wish to do more than simply
protect existing statutes and regulations; innovative “green”
enterprises and renewable-energy producers seeking to grow their
businesses; in many instances (though not all), the courts; and in
principle, the general public, to the extent that the public can be
galvanized intermittently into active pressure by environmental crises
reported in the media, or by threats to the basic legislation of
environmental protection as an election issue. In 2006, for instance,
environmental advocates helped defeat one of the most outspokenly
extreme anti-regulatory Republican House leaders, Richard Pombo,

Andrews_cpcxns (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2011]

1/17/2012 2:12 PM

THE EPA AT 40: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

255

131

in an ostensibly safe district in California, but the general public is
notoriously difficult to keep mobilized and is especially vulnerable to
other fears and priorities, such as terrorism and economic downturns.
In the 2010 election, environmental voting appears to have been
eclipsed by other issues and made little significant difference to the
132
electoral outcomes.
For the present, it is clear that any hope of significant
environmental policy reform in Congress continues to be held
hostage to bitter partisan gridlock, demonstrated most clearly in
Congress’s failure to enact any climate change legislation in 2009 or
thereafter. It is just as clear that EPA, with all the limitations as well
as the strengths of its statutory authorities, therefore remains the
nation’s key hope for action to protect the environment and public
health from harmful pollutants.
With each recent change in presidential party affiliation,
however, EPA’s policies have been subjected to exaggerated “swings
of the pendulum” between aggressiveness and laxity, based on the
ideological polarization of the two major parties on this issue and the
demonization of environmental protection policy as an element of the
anti-government core ideology that now dominates the Republican
party. The conflation of these issues, and the resulting congressional
gridlock and executive policy volatility on environmental protection
policy, have arguably been as harmful to businesses as to the
environment. This represents a pattern that serves neither the
environment nor even the business community well.
Under all administrations, moreover, there has been a large
disparity between EPA’s mandates and its funding. In real terms,
EPA’s budget in 2010 was barely above what it was in 1992, despite
its increased responsibilities, and this disparity is likely to continue if
not increase given the growing federal budget deficit and resulting
133
restrictions on discretionary domestic spending.
In short, EPA’s most serious unsolved problems and deficiencies
are congressionally imposed: they cannot be solved without

131. See Bettina Boxall, Environmentalists Savor Pombo Defeat as Sign of Power, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/nov/09/local/me-defenders9.
132. Jeffrey Jones, In U.S., Many Environmental Issues at 20-Year-Low Concern, GALLUP
(Mar.
16,
2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126716/environmental-issues-year-lowconcern.aspx.
133. ROBERT ESWORTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41149, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA): APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY2011, at 31 fig.B-1 (2010), available at
http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Jun/R41149.pdf.
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congressional will to pursue a greener economy, both by deploying
market-oriented regulatory tools and removing perverse subsidies
and other incentives that continue to protect environmentally
damaging—and economically anachronistic—practices of an earlier
era.
This continued congressional gridlock represents as much a split
in the business community as it does a partisan and ideological divide.
The split exists between businesses that want to make greener
investments and need greater certainty about future prices and
regulatory expectations to do so, and those that want to continue to
operate older facilities and more environmentally damaging practices.
It also exists between those who see environmental protection as
inherently a form of big government to be resisted and reduced, and
those who advocate ways of achieving environmental protection that
could also make markets work more efficiently on an
environmentally sustainable “level playing field;” and between those
environmental advocates who see business as inherently an enemy to
be regulated and punished, and others who seek alliances with those
businesses that could be core partners in creating a greener economy.
Finally, throughout EPA’s history the courts have played a
critical role in upholding or reversing EPA’s actions. This role reflects
complicated cross-cutting considerations. Courts must face questions
about whether they should uphold strongly environmentally
protective interpretations of the agencies’ statutes—even in some
cases in which the agency is the one trying to weaken the statute—
and whether to give broad deference to the agency’s expertise or to
take their own “hard look” at the substance of the agency’s decisions
as well as the agency’s procedures in reaching them, an approach
which has tended to increase the burden of proof on the agency
134
before approving environmentally protective regulations.
EPA’s statutory mandates to protect the environment have
frequently been protected and vindicated by the courts, even in cases
in which the EPA itself has downplayed or sought to weaken them.
As Schroeder and Glicksman comment,
Up at least through the 1990s, industry prevailed in nearly half of
the cases in which it charged that EPA provided an inadequate
explanation for its decision and both pro-industry and
proenvironmental litigants succeeded in a remarkably high
percentage of the cases in which they leveled attacks on EPA’s

134. See, e.g., Rita L. Weckler, Case Comment: A “Hard Look” at a Soft Analysis,
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145 (1994).

Andrews_cpcxns (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2011]

1/17/2012 2:12 PM

THE EPA AT 40: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

257

science based on defects in the agency’s explanations for its
decisions . . . . [At the same time,] the Courts of Appeals during the
1990s have indeed been wary about making comparative judgments
and for that reason do not typically question EPA’s evidentiary
choices or second-guess the agency in its readings of the weight of
the scientific evidence. . . . [At the same time,] the courts have not
been hesitant during the past decade to inflict defeat upon EPA
when the agency provides no evidence at all to support its technical
determinations, relies on evidence that conflicts with the stated
views of its own experts, employs technical models or
methodologies that are obviously ill-suited to assessing the impact
of the regulated activity on the environment, fails to explain in any
way an apparently illogical conclusion, is silent in the face of a
pointed and relevant question about the logic of its reasoning, or
engages in internally inconsistent reasoning or reasoning that for
unstated reasons conflicts with the agency’s own previous practice.
135

Particularly during George W. Bush’s second term, for instance,
court decisions repeatedly overruled EPA regulatory proposals to
weaken environmental regulations, such as NSR, the Clean Air
Mercury Rule which would have allowed flexible trading in place of
site-specific controls on this toxic contaminant, some portions of the
CAIR rule, and notably the Massachusetts v. EPA decision
confirming EPA’s authority, against the Bush EPA’s wishes, to
136
regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. In other cases,
however, the courts have not always supported the EPA, as evinced
by a ruling of the conservative Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co.,
overriding a number of district court decisions that had upheld strict
EPA regulation of mountaintop removal mining under the Clean
137
Water Act.
XII. THE NEXT 40 YEARS
Given this history and EPA’s current imperfect circumstances,
what should EPA aspire to look like over its next 40 years?
One would hope, first, for a broader mandate, not simply to
regulate individual pollutants and facilities, but to lead in
transforming existing government policies into more effective
incentives to create a greener, economically efficient, and

135. Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm and the EPA
in the Courts of Appeals during the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10371 (2001).
136. Cf. GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 220; cf. also Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 102.
137. 556 F.3d 177, 186 (4th Cir. 2009).
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environmentally sustainable economy. EPA also needs clearer
authority to lead in addressing global threats to the environment and
human health as they become increasingly serious.
Second, and at the very least, EPA needs statutory authority to
take more integrated approaches across its traditional regulatory
programs to reduce major pollutants in all their most significant
environmental media and exposure pathways, especially for
potentially serious new hazards such as nanomaterials.
Third, EPA needs authority to deploy a broader and more
flexible range of policy tools, including, for instance, market-oriented
138
incentives, behavioral “nudges,”
information disclosures, and
liability, all in a regulatory framework that provides more certainty
both of environmental performance outcomes and for businesses as
to what regulations and markets they will face for pollutants and
other uses of the environment. To do this well, the agency also needs
clearer authority and increased funding for applied research and
development on the social and behavioral aspects of solving
environmental problems, in order to design more effective policies
and to evaluate and improve their outcomes.
Finally, chronically underfunded, EPA needs more resources to
do the job that has been assigned to it by Congress and expected of it
by the American people.

138. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 183–96 (2008); RICHARD H. THALER, CASS R.
SUNSTEIN & JOHN P. BALZ, CHOICE ARCHITECTURE (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1583509.

